Using a database of more than 8,000 companies from 35 countries, we find that the value of corporate diversification is related to the level of capital market development, international integration, and legal systems. Our results suggest that the financial, legal, and regulatory environments each have an important influence on the value of diversification. Moreover, the optimal organizational structure and corporate governance may be very different for firms operating in emerging markets than it is for firms operating in more developed and internationally integrated countries.
I. Introduction
The connection between corporate diversification and firm value continues to generate substantial interest among financial theorists and practitioners. Some evidence suggests that for U.S. firms, diversification reduces value [e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , John and Ofek (1995) , Comment and Jarrell (1995) , and Lamont and Polk (2002)]. One explanation for these findings is that diversified firms face higher agency costs as a consequence of their organizational form. For example, recent papers have argued that intra-firm coordination problems are likely to be more extensive for diversified firms because of their need to allocate capital among their various disparate activities [e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998) Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , and Scharfstein (1998)].
1 By contrast, other empirical evidence suggests that diversification does not necessarily reduce firm value [e.g., Graham, Lemon and Wolf (2002) and Campa and Kedia (2002) ]. At the same time, some theoretical work suggests that there may also be benefits from diversification. In particular, work by Williamson (1975) , Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) , Harris and Raviv (1996) , and Stein (1997) suggests that capital constrained firms may establish internal capital markets that are able to effectively allocate capital within the firm. 2 Recent empirical evidence documents that there are systematic patterns in the internal allocation of capital in diversified firms [e.g., Shin and Stulz (1998), Lamont (1997) , Houston, James, and Marcus (1997) , Scharfstein (1998) , Whited (2001) , Khanna and Tice (2001) , and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) stand-alone firms to raise capital, it may be more valuable for firms in less developed markets where it is more costly to raise external capital. The economic and legal environment in less developed markets may also make it more difficult to contract with other firms, and therefore, may provide an additional benefit to diversification.
Therefore, we expect that internal capital markets are most valuable among firms and economies where it is costly to obtain external capital. A firm's access to external capital depends on the extent to which capital markets are developed within the country where the firm operates and the extent to which that country/firm is able to attract foreign capital. Unless the costs of diversification (whether they arise from agency problems or other phenomena) are significantly higher in these countries, we expect that the benefits from diversification are higher in countries where capital markets are less developed, where they are less internationally integrated (i.e., where capital markets are less open to foreign capital), and in countries where the legal system provides limited protection to investors. 3 If this conjecture is correct, it raises the possibility that the results indicating a diversification discount for the U.S. do not generalize to other countries where external capital is more costly. The net effect of benefits versus costs, however, is ultimately an empirical question. Recent evidence by Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2001) , Lins (2002) , and others suggests that agency costs across countries are not necessarily constant and are likely to be higher in emerging markets. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) , however, also suggest that even in developed countries, the diversion of corporate resources can be substantial.
To date, the international evidence regarding corporate diversification has been limited. One notable exception is the work by Lins and Servaes (1999) who examine a sample of firms from Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom in 1992 and 1994 and report valuation discounts that are of similar magnitude to those reported for U.S. firms.
Moreover, their estimated diversification discounts remain statistically significant for Japan and the United Kingdom even after controlling for firm characteristics. In Germany, after controlling for firm characteristics, they also report a diversification discount, but it is not statistically different from zero. In Lins and Servaes (2002) , they use data from 1995 to investigate the value of corporate diversification for seven emerging Asian market countries, namely Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Pooling the countries in their sample, they find a significant diversification discount for firms that are a part of industrial groups and for firms with management ownership concentration between 10 and 30 percent. 4 Lins and Servaes, however, do not directly examine the link between corporate diversification and capital market development, international integration, and legal systems.
In contrast to Lins and Servaes (2002) , Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that diversification may be more valuable in emerging markets than in more developed economies. Khanna and Palepu's analysis focuses on diversified business groups within India. They find that larger diversified groups that are in a better position to tap external capital outperform smaller unaffiliated firms. Khanna and Palepu's study provides some indirect support for our hypothesis that the value of diversification depends on the level of capital market development and international integration.
In this paper, we extend the existing literature in two ways. First, we use a broader set of countries to more comprehensively examine the value of corporate diversification across countries. Second, we directly investigate the link between the value of corporate diversification and capital market development, international integration, and legal systems. More specifically, we assemble a data set that consists of more than 8,000 firms from 35 countries over the period 1991 through 1995. Using the methodology employed by Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lins and Servaes (1999) , we calculate the implied value gain or loss from diversification. This approach compares the value of a diversified firm to a portfolio of stand-alone firms in the same industries. We also test whether the gain or loss that results from diversification is systematically related to the level of a country's capital market development, international integration, and legal system.
Our results provide evidence that the value of diversification is related to the degree of country's capital market development, international integration, and legal system. In particular, after controlling for firm-specific factors such as firm size, capital structure, profitability, and ownership structure, we find that the value of diversification is negatively related to various proxies for the level of capital market development and international integration. Among high-income countries, where capital markets are well developed and internationally integrated, we find a statistically significant diversification discount. This finding is consistent with the U.S. evidence and the international evidence presented by Lins and Servaes (1999) . By contrast, for the countries where capital markets are less developed and are segmented from international capital markets, we find that there is either a significant diversification premium or no diversification discount.
For these firms, the benefits of diversification appear to offset the costs of diversification.
These results are consistent with the evidence of Khanna and Palepu from Indian business groups.
We also find that the diversification discount systematically varies with the legal system. LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (1997) document that the English legal system provides the most protection to capital providers. If this protection results in better access to external capital, the benefits of internal capital markets and corporate diversification will arguably be smaller in countries that operate under a legal system with English origin. Consistent with this argument, we find that diversification discounts are largest among countries where the legal system is of English origin. We find smaller diversification discounts in countries where the legal system is of a German, Scandinavian, or French origin.
While our results provide further insights into the factors influencing crosssectional and cross-country variations in the value of diversification, a couple of provisos are in order. In estimating the value of diversification, we make the standard assumption that stand-alone firms are the appropriate benchmark for assessing the performance of diversified firms. Some recent research by Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) and others argues that this standard approach suffers from potential selection biases that may result in an overstatement of diversification discounts. However, as further argued by Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) , even if the "true" distribution is centered closer to 0, the cross-sectional distribution of excess values remains to be explained. Our crosscountry results relating the value of corporate diversification to the level of a country's capital market development, international integration, and legal system provides some additional cross-sectional evidence in this regard.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our data and the various proxies that we employ for capital market development, international integration, and legal systems for each of the 35 countries in our sample. In Section III, we describe the methodology used to calculate the value of corporate diversification, and we provide estimates of the average value of corporate diversification by various country characteristics. Section IV provides regression results regarding the value of diversification after controlling for firm-specific characteristics. Section V examines the links between the value of diversification and ownership structure. In Section VI, we provide a number of robustness tests, while Section VII provides a conclusion.
II. Data and Summary Statistics

A. Sample Construction
Our main data source is Worldscope. This databank is also used by LaPorta, -De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) , Lins and Servaes (1999 ), Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2000 ,2002 , and LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) among many others. Worldscope has financial and business segment data for more than 8,000 companies located in 49 countries. The firms in the databank represent 86 percent of global market capitalization. The business segment data starts in 1991. Our sample period extends from 1991 through 1995. 5 We use the reported business segment data to classify publicly traded firms as either single-segment (focused) or multi-segment (diversified). We classify firms as single-segment firms if they report only one two-digit SIC code. Firms are classified as multi-segment if they report more than one SIC segment, and the largest segment has less than 90 percent of the total sales for the company. 5 We thank Worldscope for providing us with machine-readable access to their databank, which has more complete coverage than the CD ROMS. We are unable to identify firms that may be diversified, but only report one SIC code.
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We also exclude firms where more than fifty percent of firm sales come from financial services (i.e., SIC codes 6000-6999) and firms where there are no pure play matches and corresponding segment sales exceed 25 percent of total sales. These two screens account for 85.38 percent of the firms eliminated from our sample (11,578 and 3,600 firms, respectively). Finally, we exclude firms where the actual value is more than four times the imputed value. This screen accounts for the remaining 12.14 percent (2,158 firms) of the excluded firms.
Our sampling procedure differs from Lins and Servaes' (1999) in three ways.
First, they exclude service firms -the reason being that were relatively few service firms in Germany, and they wanted to control for industry differences across the three countries that they were investigating. In our study, we include the broadest possible sample of firms and countries. Second, Lins and Servaes also exclude firms that do not trade on the country's main exchange. Third, Lins and Servaes use a random sample of 450 firms from Japan and the United Kingdom in 1992 and 1994, whereas we use all firms in the databank that meet our screens. While our sampling procedure is somewhat different, the estimated diversification discounts that we find for Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom are quite similar to those reported by Lins and Servaes (1999) .
B. Country-Level Factors Influencing the Value of Corporate Diversification
To test our main hypothesis, we use the following proxies to measure the degree of capital market development, international integration, and the level of investor protection for each of the 35 countries in our sample.
The Level of Capital Market Development
Recent research demonstrates that there is a strong link between capital market development and economic development [see, for example, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundbland (2002) , Stulz (2000) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Levine (1997) , and King and Levine (1993a Levine ( , 1993b Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) , Bekaert and Harvey (2000) , and Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) also use the country credit rating by the Institutional Investor. The country credit ratings come from semi-annual surveys of 75-100 bankers who rate each country on a scale from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the smallest default risk.
As a robustness check, we also consider some additional measures of capital market development from LLSV. These country-level measures include external market capitalization plus debt to GNP (MKTCAP + Debt/GNP), the ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (Domestic Firms/Pop), and the ratio of the number of initial public offerings of equity in a given country to its population (IPOs/Pop) in 1995. These data are obtained from LLSV (1997).
The Level of International Capital Market Integration
If capital markets are perfectly integrated worldwide, we expect that firms will be able to access external capital at the global cost of capital, even if the financial sector is less developed in the country in which they operate. 6 Therefore, a high level of international capital market integration should lead to a greater diversification discount all else equal. While capital markets have become more internationally integrated, existing evidence suggests that markets are not completely international integrated and that the level of integration varies across countries and over time [see, for instance, Jorion and Schwartz (1986) , Cho, Eun, and Senbet (1986) , Wheatley (1988) , Gultekin, Gultekin, and Penati (1989) , Mittoo (1992) , Chen and Knez (1995) , Bekaert and Harvey (1995) , Naranjo and Protopapadakis (1997) , Stulz (1999) , Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) , and Edison and Warnock (2001)].
Borrowing from Bekaert and Harvey (1995) we convert it to one minus their measure so that its interpretation is consistent with the Bekaert and Harvey measure. That is, a maximum value of one implies complete international integration (i.e., no foreign ownership restrictions), whereas a minimum value of zero implies that the country's capital markets are completely segmented from international capital markets (i.e., completely restricted).
As an additional integration related robustness check and to further investigate potential time-related dynamics, we also examine the influence of both the intensity and time since liberalization on the value of corporate diversification. For this analysis, we use the "official" liberalization dates from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002) and the liberalization intensity measure also proposed by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002) .
The Legal System
We also control for the country's legal system to take into account the evidence by LLSV (1997, 1998) which documents a link between legal systems and the value of capital market development. LLSV classify countries into four different legal systems:
those with English, French, German, and Scandinavian origin. Their evidence suggests that a country's legal system significantly affects the level of protection that is given to investors, which in turn affects the availability and cost of external capital. In particular, they find that the English system, with its common law origin, provides investors with the strongest legal protection, while the French legal system provides the least protection.
They also argue that countries whose legal system is of German or Scandinavian origin have a moderate level of investor protection, falling somewhere between the English and French systems. Controlling for economic development, we would therefore expect that diversification discounts would be largest among countries with an English legal system, since firms in these countries are likely to have access to external capital at lower costs.
C. Summary Statistics
Table I provides summary information on international capital market integration, legal system classifications, the level of economic development, and country credit ratings for each country in our sample. We use the integration measures reported in Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2001) , the legal classifications reported in LLSV, and the country credit ratings from the Institutional Investor. For the Bekaert and Harvey time varying capital market integration measure, a "yes" in Table I indicates that the country was integrated in each year over our sample period, while a "no" indicates that it was not integrated in at least one year over our sample period. For the Edison and Warnock integration measure, we provide the five-year arithmetic average, where the range is between 0 (complete international segmentation) and 1 (complete international integration). In the third column of Table I , we provide the World Bank development classification. Each year, the World Bank classifies countries into four categories: high income, upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and low income. As shown in Table I , this classification also largely coincides with per-capita GNP. The reported average per-capita GNP is the five-year arithmetic average over our sample period. This measure ranges from $316 in India to $36,800 in Switzerland. In the fifth column of Table I , we report the five-year arithmetic average country credit rating for each country over our sample period, while the last column reports the number of firm observations in 1991 and 1995 by country.
III. Estimating the Value of Corporate Diversification
A. Methodology
To estimate the value of corporate diversification, we modify the approach originally used by Berger and Ofek (1995) . In our analysis, we use the ratio of totalcapital-to-sales to measure corporate performance, where total capital is calculated by adding the market value of equity to the book value of debt. Along with this measure, Berger and Ofek (1995) also consider two other ratios to measure performance: the ratio of total-capital-to-assets and the ratio of total-capital-to-earnings. Their results are qualitatively similar for each of the three performance measures. We are unable to use these alternative measures because there is very little business segment data regarding assets or earnings for the non-U.S. firms.
We calculate the excess value of each firm by taking the difference between the firm's actual performance and its imputed performance. Actual performance is measured by the consolidated firm's capital-to-sales ratio. For single-segment firms, imputed value is calculated as the median capital-to-sales ratio among all pure-play (single-segment firms) within the same industry and same country. The average number of pure-plays ranges from 1.30 in New Zealand to 29.44 in the U.S., while the average number of pureplays in the less developed markets is 3.02. For multi-segment firms, imputed value is calculated by taking a weighted-average of the imputed values for each of the firm's segments, where the weights reflect the proportion of the overall firm's sales that come from each segment. Multi-segment firms have a positive excess value (i.e., a premium) if the overall company's value is greater than the "sum of the parts." By contrast, multisegment firms have a negative excess value if their value is less than the imputed value that would be obtained by taking a portfolio of pure-play firms that operate in the same industries and country as the diversified firm. As discussed earlier, one drawback of this valuation approach is that it potentially overstates corporate diversification discounts due to selection biases (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) ). However, to the extent that there are not significant cross-country variations in these biases, they are less likely to influence our cross-country tests relating the value of corporate diversification to the level of a country's capital market development, international integration, and legal system.
We define industries at the two-digit SIC code level. In cases where there are no other two-digit pure-plays firms to match from, we calculate the imputed market capitalto-sales ratio using broader industry classifications defined by Campbell (1996) . Finally, to avoid having the results driven by extreme values, we exclude firms where the actual value is more than four times the imputed value, or where the imputed value is more than four times the actual value. Table II reports The results suggest that the value of diversification varies negatively with the degree of international capital market integration. In the first group, where countries are perfectly integrated (i.e., INTEGINT=1), the mean diversification discount is 5.88 percent and the median discount is 5.03 percent. For firms who are headquartered in more internationally segmented markets (i.e., 1.0 > INTEGINT ≥ 0.5), the mean diversification discount drops to 0.56 percent and the median discount drops to 1.42 percent. In the most internationally segmented group (i.e., 0.5 > INTEGINT ≥ 0.0), the mean diversification premium is 1.69 percent and the median premium is 0.62 percent.
B. The Value of Diversification
Panel B classifies firms according to their country's legal system. The results indicate that diversified firms trade at substantial discounts if they operate in a country with a legal system of English origin. Among these countries, the median discount is 8.57 percent. Among the other countries in the sample with French, German, and
Scandinavian legal origin, we find no evidence of either a diversification discount or premium. These results complement the evidence reported by LLSV (1997). Their results suggest that the English legal system provides the most protection to external investors, which generally leads to more developed capital markets. Our results suggest that the value of internal capital markets is smallest when capital markets are most developed.
In Panel C, firms are classified into per-capita GNP groupings. The results suggest that the value of diversification varies with the level of economic development.
Firms that operate in countries with a per-capita GNP in excess of $15,000 have a mean diversification discount of 5.79 percent and a median discount of 5.78 percent. The results are also strikingly different for firms headquartered in the emerging market countries. Among these firms, the mean diversification premium is 8.41 percent and the median premium is 5.41 percent.
Finally, Panel D classifies firms into three groups by varying levels of country credit rating. Similar to the earlier groupings, the results suggest that the value of diversification varies with the level of a country's credit rating. Firms that operate in countries with a high credit rating (i.e., CCR ≥ 75.00) have a mean diversification discount of 4.85 percent and a median discount of 3.06 percent. In contrast, for firms headquartered in countries with the lowest credit ratings (i.e., 50.00 > CCR ≥ 0.00), the mean diversification premium is 1.49 percent and the median premium is 2.16 percent.
IV. Regression Results
The results reported in Table II suggest that the value of diversified firms is affected by degree of international capital market integration, development, and investor protection. While these results provide an overall depiction of the value of diversification among the various groupings, they do not control for individual firm characteristics, which may also affect the firm's market-to-sales ratio. These other characteristics include the firm's size, profitability, and future growth opportunities. To control for these factors, the following baseline regression model is estimated for each firm in our sample. Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , and Lins and Servaes (1999) also estimate similar models. The baseline regressions also include various combinations of the country-level proxies measuring the level of international capital market integration, development, and indicator variables representing the country's legal system. Excess value is defined to be the natural log of the ratio of the firm's market value to its imputed value. The level of diversification is measured in two ways. The first uses a diversification dummy (SEG) that is equal to one for multi-segment firms and is otherwise zero. The second calculates a sales-based Herfindahl index (HERF) that more completely captures the level of diversification among multi-segment firms. This measure is calculated as where Sales i corresponds to the sales for segment i, and segment sales are identified according to firm segment SIC codes. If any one segment accounts for 90% or more of total sales, we set the herfindahl equal to 1, making the firm a single segment firm (i.e., focused). So that the results can be consistently interpreted across the two diversification measures (i.e., SEG versus HERF), (1-HERF) is used in the regression analysis.
Looking at the other firm-specific characteristics, the log of assets controls for potential firm size effects. The ratio of operating income-to-sales (OIS) provides a measure of firm profitability, while the ratio of capital expenditures-to-sales (CES)
proxies for the level of growth opportunities. Controlling for the other factors, a positive link between excess value and both OIS and CES is expected. Since the data covers five years, separate year dummies are included in the regressions to control for intertemporal variations in market or economic conditions that may also affect the firm's market-tosales ratio.
In Panel A of Table III , the first four columns report results using the diversification dummy, SEG, as the measure of corporate diversification, while the last two columns report results where HERF is used as the measure of corporate diversification. In the first column, the Edison and Warnock measure of integration is used and Per-Capita GNP is excluded from the specification due its high correlation with the Institutional Investor's country credit rating (i.e., correlation of 0.84). 7 The full specification, including Per-Capita GNP, is reported in the second column. The third column also reports results for the full specification, but the Bekaert and Harvey (1995) international integration measure is used in place of the Edison and Warnock international integration measure. The fourth column reports fixed effects estimates of the full specification. The last two columns also report results for the full specification, but (1-HERF) is used in place of SEG.
Looking across each of the columns in Panel A of Table III , the coefficients corresponding to the firm specific control variables (i.e., OIS, CES, and ASSETS) are highly significant and positive as predicted. The results across each of the columns, moreover, shows there is a statistically significant negative relation between the value of diversification and each integration measure, the country credit rating, and per-capita GNP. However, the country credit rating relation is only significant when we exclude Per-Capita GNP from the full specification. This result is likely due to the high correlation between Per-Capita GNP and the country credit rating. Turning to the legal system coefficient estimates, they are also significantly different from zero, and the estimated coefficients have the predicted signs. In particular, we find that the estimated coefficients are positive for the French, German, and Scandinavian legal dummy variables, indicating that diversification provides greater benefits and/or fewer costs relative to firms that operate in a country with a legal system of English origin. Looking more closely at the estimated coefficient for the legal system dummy variables, the coefficient for the German legal system has the greatest magnitude. This result suggests that after controlling for the other relevant factors, the net costs of diversification are the smallest for firms that operate under the German legal system. All in all, both the SEG and HERF specifications provide similar results.
In Panel B of Table III, 
V. Ownership and the Value of Corporate Diversification
The results in Section IV suggest that corporate diversification is more beneficial/less costly for firms that are headquartered in countries where capital markets are more internationally segmented, less developed, and where external capital is costly to obtain. A potential problem with this conclusion is that, so far, we have not explicitly where an individual or institution holds at least five percent of a company's common stock. Summing up these reported holdings across all shareholders, we obtain a measure of ownership concentration for each firm. 8 While ownership data are available for a subset of firms in our sample, an important concern arises when using this data. In many cases, there is no clear distinction between firms where no individual or institution holds a five percent stake and firms that choose not to report any ownership data. This reporting bias also appears to be systematic in that ownership data is reported much less regularly among firms headquartered in less developed countries. To insure that this reporting bias does not affect the qualitative nature of the results, some robustness checks are performed.
A. Regression Results Controlling for Ownership Concentration
Similar to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and others, we also account for the nonlinear relation between ownership structure and firm value by creating three separate ownership concentration variables: This classification suggests that the marginal impact of increased ownership concentration varies depending on whether ownership concentration is less than 10 percent, between 10 and 30 percent, and greater than 30 percent. We also interact
OWN10to30 and OWNover30 with the dummy variable SEG, which equals one if the firm has multiple segments, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on the value of corporate diversification.
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The firm level regression estimates that control for ownership concentration are reported in Table IV . The results confirm the findings reported in Table III concerning the significant negative relation between the value of corporate diversification and international capital market integration, development, and a country's credit rating. The earlier findings with respect to the influence of a country's legal system on the value of corporate diversification are also confirmed. While it is not the primary focus of our analysis, the estimated coefficients on ownership concentration are also of considerable interest. First, for low levels of ownership concentration, there is a positive link between ownership concentration and excess value. This result, however, is likely a manifestation of the large portion of potentially unreported ownership observations that are classified as zeros. Second, for ownership concentration levels beyond ten percent, we generally find that increases in ownership concentration lead to a reduction in value for both focused and diversified firms. This result confirms the fact that there are both costs and benefits associated with increased ownership concentration. Finally, we see from the coefficients on the ownership concentration variables that are interacted with the diversification dummy (OWN10to30*SEG and OWNover30*SEG), that the effects of ownership concentration are significantly different for focused and diversified firms. For ownership concentration levels between 10 and 30 percent, excess value is significantly lower for the diversified firms, suggesting that entrenchment problems and expropriation of minority shareholders is more of a concern for diversified firms. However, beyond 30 percent, excess value is significantly higher for diversified firms.
VI. Some Additional Robustness Tests
A. Sensitivity Analysis
We also perform various sensitivity tests with respect to firm control groups, data screens, firm and country level proxies, and regression specifications and procedures. In each case, we obtain similar results. In particular, if we increase the required minimum number of pure-play matches to three firms in the control group, we obtain similar results but with a considerably smaller sample. Similarly, if we eliminate firms from the sample that do not have a two-digit pure-play match instead of using the broader industry match defined by Campbell (1996) in those cases, we also obtain similar results. Furthermore, if we use a more conservative screen of excluding firms where the actual value exceeds the imputed value by a factor of three instead of four, we also obtain similar results.
In the analysis, we primarily use per-capita GNP and legal origin indicator variables as proxies for capital market development and the legal environment. However, to insure that our results are robust, we also use other proxies. LaPorta, Lopez-DeSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) analyze several measures of capital market development and the legal environment across 49 countries. In particular, as measures of capital market development for each country, they consider the ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to GNP (External Cap/GNP), the ratio of the sum of bank debt of the private sector and outstanding non-financial bonds to GNP (Debt/GNP), the ratio of the number of domestic firms listed in a given country to its population (Domestic Firms/Pop), and the ratio of the number of the initial public offerings of equity in a given country to its population (IPOs/Pop) in 1995. LLSV also find that the law and order tradition (Rule of Law) in each country is an important determinant of external finance.
As a robustness check, we also ran regressions using the capital market development and legal environment proxies used by LLSV as alternative explanatory variables. 11 These (unreported) results suggest that the coefficient estimates on per-capita GNP, external market capitalization plus debt to GNP, and domestic firms to population are all negative and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient on IPOs to population is not statistically different from zero. We also find that the coefficient estimates on the legal origin indicator variables remain significant, while the coefficient on the Rule of Law variable is not statistically different from zero. The fixed-effects estimates are also consistent with the OLS results.
As an additional robustness check, we use the number of firm segments as an alternative diversification measure and obtain similar results. Using the Bekaert and Harvey (1995) measure of integration in place of the Edison and Warnock measure of integration intensity also yields similar results for both the unconditional and conditional analysis. We also estimate the specifications on a year-by-year basis and obtain similar results. Finally, we estimate group-level regressions based on the groupings in Table II, but controlling for firm characteristics. With this additional robustness check, we obtain conditional diversification discounts/premiums similar to the unconditional results reported in Table II .
B. Accounting Issues
Throughout our analysis, we use the market-to-sales ratio as a proxy for firm value. One concern is that our results may be biased by cross-country differences in the accounting practices that firms employ when they hold either a majority or minority stake in another firm. 12 For our purposes, these accounting biases are particularly important if the magnitude of the biases vary across countries and vary between focused and diversified firms. We find that for 5 of the 35 countries (Denmark, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy and Malaysia), diversified firms have a significantly higher proportion of minority interest income as a percentage of sales. The market-to-sales ratios for these countries tend to be biased downward more often for diversified firms, which would bias us towards finding a diversification discount in these countries. For 2 of the 35 countries (France and Switzerland), we find that focused firms have a significantly higher proportion of income from unconsolidated affiliates as a percentage of sales. The market-to-sales ratios for these countries tend to be biased upward more often for single segment firms, which would also bias us towards finding a diversification discount in these countries.
To insure that our results are not driven by these accounting biases, we eliminated from our sample firms where minority interest income is greater than 2% of sales and firms where investment income from unconsolidated affiliates is greater than 2% of sales.
After eliminating these firms, the link between the country proxies and excess value is somewhat stronger and statistically more significant. Moreover, there still remains a strong link between the legal system dummies and excess value, although the dummy corresponding to the French legal system is marginally significant and the Scandinavian legal system dummy is no longer significant.
VII. Conclusion
Using a large database of more than 8,000 companies from 35 countries, we analyze the link between the value of corporate diversification and international capital market integration, development, and legal systems. We find evidence that the value of corporate diversification is negatively related to the level of international capital market integration and development. Among firms in high-income countries where capital markets are well developed and internationally integrated, we find that diversified firms trade at a significant discount relative to focused firms. This evidence is consistent with previous studies (Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) ) that have documented a diversification discount for U.S. firms. In contrast, we find that there is either no diversification discount, or in some cases, a significant diversification premium, in countries whose capital markets are less developed and segmented from international capital markets. However, given the recent findings of Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) and others, it is important to further emphasize that the relative cross-country variations in the value of corporate diversification potentially provide more information than the implied levels of the diversification discounts. Finally, consistent with the findings of LLSV (1997, 1998) , we also find that the value of diversification depends in an important way on the legal system of the country in which the firm is established.
Overall, our results suggest that the financial, legal, and regulatory environment all have an important influence on the value of diversification, and that the optimal organizational structure for firms operating in emerging markets may be very different than that for firms operating in more developed countries. In this regard, our results provide support for the arguments made by Khanna and Palepu (2000), who find that diversified industry groups in India often outperform their stand-alone counterparts. Our results are also consistent with Lins and Servaes (1999) who find that diversified firms in Japan and the United Kingdom (countries that are considered to be developed) generally trade at discounts relative to focused firms. Our findings further suggest that the value of diversification within a given country declines over time as the country's capital markets become more developed and internationally integrated. Hubbard and Palia (1999) also provide some evidence in this regard by considering the value of diversification in the U.S. during the conglomerate wave of the 1960s.
While we argue that cross-country variations in the value of diversification vary with the level of international capital market integration and development, our results can be interpreted more broadly. In addition to providing better access to capital markets, or limiting the need to access these markets, diversification may provide other important benefits -particularly in countries where the economic and legal system are less developed. If the economic and legal environments make it more difficult to contract with other firms, it may be more beneficial to merge related enterprises within the same organization than it is to have them operate on a separate, stand-alone basis. Diversified firms in these countries may also be better able to attract quality employees and better able to lobby or influence the political and regulatory process. Ultimately, each of these explanations may be applicable. We use the integration measures reported in Bekaert and Harvey (1995) and Edison and Warnock (2001) . Specifically, we use Bekaert and Harvey's (1995) time varying integration dates and Edison and Warnock's (2001) intensity of capital controls measure. For the Bekaert and Harvey time varying capital market integration measure, we use a binary variable each year equal to 1 if the country is integrated and 0 if it is not integrated. For Edison and Warnock's integration measure, we use their intensity of capital controls measure in each year, but we convert it to one minus their measure so that its interpretation is consistent with Bekaert and Harvey's measure. That is, a maximum value of one implies complete integration (i.e., no foreign ownership restrictions), whereas a minimum value of zero implys that the country's capital markets are completely segmented (i.e., the country has completely binding foreign ownership restrictions). For the Bekaert and Harvey time varying capital market integration measure, "yes" in Table I means that the country was integrated in each year over our sample period for the respective country, while "no" means that it was not integrated in at least one year over our sample period. For Edison and Warnock's integration measure, we provide the five-year arithmetic average, where the range is between 0 (complete segmentation) and 1 (complete integration). The legal system classification identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country. The legal system classifications are obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) . Average per-capita GNP (US $) is the five year arithmetic average of per-capita GNP from 1991-1995, whereas average country credit rating is the five year arithmetic average of Institutional Investor's country credit rating from 1991-1995. Excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's market-to-sales ratio to its imputed market-to-sales ratio. Firms with excess values that are greater than four or less than one-fourth are eliminated from the sample. Single-segment firms are firms that operate in only one two-digit SIC code industry. Multi-segment firms are defined as firms that operate in two or more two-digit SIC code industries and no firm segment sales exceed 90% of total firm sales. Regression estimates are from 1991-1995. Excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's market-to-sales ratio to its imputed market-to-sales ratio. Firms with excess values that are greater than four or less than one-fourth are eliminated from the sample. The diversification dummy, SEG, is equal to one for multi-segment firms and zero otherwise. Multi-segment firms are defined as firms that operate in two or more two-digit SIC code industries and no firm segment sales exceed 90% of total firm sales. HERF is defined as: , where Sales i corresponds to the sales for segment i. If any one segment accounts for more than 90% of total sales, then we set the herfindahl equal to 1, making the firm a single segment firm (i.e., focused). So that the results can be consistently interpreted across the two diversification measures (i.e., SEG versus HERF), we use (1-HERF) in our regression analysis. INTEGINT is based on the Edison and Warnock (2001) intensity of capital controls measure, where INTEGINT ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect international integration (i.e., no restrictions) and 0 indicating complete international segmentation (i.e., completely restricted). INTEGTV is based on the Bekaert and Harvey (1995) time varying capital market integration measure. We use a binary variable each year equal to 1 if the country is internationally integrated and 0 if it is not integrated. LIBINT is based on the Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002) liberalization intensity measure, where LIBINT ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect international integration (i.e., all stocks are available to foreign investors) and 0 indicating complete international segmentation (i.e., completely restricted). In a given year, LIBG1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the time since liberalization is less than five years and zero otherwise, while LIBG2 is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the time since liberalization is greater than or equal to five years but less than ten years and zero otherwise. LIBTIM is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the time since liberalization in a given year is greater than or equal to five years and zero otherwise. CRR is Institutional Investor's country credit rating, which ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the smallest default risk. GNPCAP is the annual per-capita GNP of the country where the firm is headquartered. French, German, and Scandinavian are dummy variables corresponding to each legal system. The dummy variables are equal to one for each corresponding classification and zero otherwise. Each model specification also includes year dummies for 1992-1995. Significant at 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), and 10 percent (*) levels. a coefficient estimate x 10 -5 .
Table IV continued
Regression estimates are from 1991-1995. Excess value is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's market-to-sales ratio to its imputed market-to-sales ratio. Firms with excess values that are greater than four or less than one-fourth are eliminated from the sample. The diversification dummy, SEG, is equal to one for multi-segment firms and zero otherwise. Multi-segment firms are defined as firms that operate in two or more two-digit SIC code industries and no firm segment sales exceed 90% of total firm sales. HERF is defined as: , where Sales i corresponds to the sales for segment i. If any one segment accounts for more than 90% of total sales, then we set the herfindahl equal to 1, making the firm a single segment firm (i.e., focused). So that the results can be consistently interpreted across the two diversification measures (i.e., SEG versus HERF), we use (1-HERF) in our regression analysis. INTEGINT is based on the Edison and Warnock (2001) intensity of capital controls measure, where INTEGINT ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect international integration (i.e., no restrictions) and 0 indicating complete international segmentation (i.e., completely restricted). INTEGTV is based on the Bekaert and Harvey (1995) time varying capital market integration measure. We use a binary variable each year equal to 1 if the country is internationally integrated and 0 if it is not integrated. CRR is Institutional Investor's country credit rating, which ranges from 0 to 100, with 100 representing the smallest default risk. GNPCAP is the annual per-capita GNP of the country where the firm is headquartered. French, German, and Scandinavian are dummy variables corresponding to each legal system. The dummy variables are equal to one for each corresponding classification and zero otherwise. Worldscope provides firm level ownership data that consists of reported cases where an individual or institution holds at least five percent of a company's common stock. Summing up these reported holdings, we obtain ownership 
